Ramaphosa, Gordhan and the New Contours of ANC Power
Contestations
By Dumisani Tembe
19/1/2020
The emerging power dynamics within the ANC, are not meant
to get rid of president Ramaphosa, at least not for now, nor at the next
National General Council (NGC) meeting. Rather, the strategy is to politically
muscle him to take decisions in favour of the emerging political nexus of David
Mabuza; Paul Mashatile; and possibly Gwede Mantashe.
The aim cant be to
get rid of Ramaphosa when no one has yet, as a possible challenger and
possible replacement to Ramaphosa. In fact, it is unthinkable that there could be someone in the top leadership of the ANC who would like to be president in the current crisis ridden South Africa.
Contrary to the notion that some ANC leaders are using
minister Pravin Gordhan to get to Ramaphosa, it is actually the opposite – the focus is on Gordhan through the non performing and parasitic state-owned
enterprises. The real strategy is to force Ramaphosa to get rid of Gordhan, and
possibly restructure state owned enterprises, and bring in new leadership.
Ordinarily, this would be a governance issue. It is
a call for accountability aimed at ensuring the performance of state-owned
enterprises. Therefore, it is to be expected that those that have been entrusted
with the political executive leadership responsibility should be called to
account, and failing which, be dismissed. However, in the factious character of ANC
internal politics, this too is subject to self-serving conspiratorial interpretations.
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Ironically, Pravin’s defenders are inadvertently making it
easy for the political nexus pushing for his removal. This is the case because the main power base of Pravin,
is not so much within the ANC, but within liberal capital institutions, and pronounced
mainly through their mainstream liberal media.
Whilst the Veterans league has
come out in support of Gordhan, it is a frail element within the ANC
structures. It is also inconceivable that Gordhan could get support from the
nonexistent Youth League, and the ANCWL. One alliance, Cosatu, has
already pronounced against Pravin, within the quest for functional and
performing SoEs. The SACP will most likely be guided by the direction of the power wind.
In essence, Pravin is politically thin and vulnerable within the ANC
structures. Add to this, the political authority of Ramaphosa that Pravin could rely on, is politically weak. In fact, both are vulnerable.
During the Zuma regime, Pravin was able to defend himself
against political challenge as the then Minister of Finance, by arguing that he was
protecting South Africa’s fiscus. And that the attack on him was an attempt to
tap into the country’s financial cookie jar.
This time around, Pravin’s defense against his detractors, is that he is
being targeted through the “push back” by state capturers. Whilst the defence worked worked, the claim for fighting "state capture fight back" is borders on a conspiracy theory.
In the current challenge against Pravin, there is a bit more
sophistication. They have framed their challenge on Pravin as a matter of
governance of SoEs. They have positioned their concern as a matter of
nonperformance of SoEs. Theirs, as they will argue, is to deal with the
parasitic problem of SoEs. The ongoing power blackouts as a result of Eskom’s
poor performance, gives Pravin detractors an ethical governance edge.
Ramaphosa’s predecessors, particularly former presidents
Thabo Mbeki, and Jacob Zuma, were very strong in defence of their
ministers. However, currently there is absolute confidence among some
leaders of the ANC that they can muscle Ramaphosa to reshuffle some ministers
out – in this case, Pravin. This points out at the Ramaphosa’s political power
weakness both at the party, and state levels.
This is probably the very first time that the ruling party
and state president has been challenged so early in his first term of
presidency since 1994. Nelson Mandela sailed through his first and only term,
well, simply because he was just Nelson Mandela after all.
President Thabo Mbeki’s political power was solid in his
first term mainly because of the strength of the ANC Youth League under the
stewardship of Peter Mokaba that propelled him into power. Mbeki also
benefitted from the then relatively strong values of political discipline that
were inherent in the ANC as a liberation movement at the time.
Mbeki understood political power within the dynamics of the
then ANC. He consciously and deliberately sought to consolidate his political
power base from within the ANC itself. It is for this reason that even when he
sought a third term as ANC president, he enjoyed a relative strong lobby within
the ANC.
President Jacob Zuma also consolidated his political power
base from within the ANC during his first term. He was untouchable. Virtually
all the leagues within the ANC were his power base. This extended to the
alliance partners: Cosatu; SACP; and SANCO.
Mbeki and Zuma consolidated power both at the Luthuli
House, and the Union buildings. That is, they consolidated their power both at
the political party level, and at the state level. They were the power focal
point both at the party, and state levels during their respective reigns.
Meanwhile, President Cyril Ramaphosa enjoys presidential
authority, and not necessarily political power. That is, he enjoys the
authority of the position of being the party’s, and state president. He enjoys
the legitimacy that he was duly elected at the party’s elective conference. But
he does not enjoy the absolute political power that ordinarily comes with
holding the president’s position.
There are a few reasons for this situation:
Firstly, Ramaphosa was not propelled into power by a strong
faction within the ANC. Whilst the SACP, and Cosatu presented a useful push
from within the liberation movement, the stronger push for Ramaphosa came from
liberal capital institutions, liberals outside the ANC, and through liberal media
agencies.
Ramaphosa also benefitted immensely from the work of the
then Public Protector, Professor Thuli Madonsela, particular on her unfinished
report on state capture.
It is now common knowledge that a number of domestic
and international institutions poured significant amounts of financial
resources in propelling Ramaphosa to the apex of the ANC, and that of the
country. Overall, the elective conference
that elected Ramaphosa to the ANC presidency, money had the most impact than
policy and developmental persuasions within the ANC.
The sum total of all this, is that Ramaphosa rose into the
ANC presidency with a weak political base. This makes him vulnerable, and
easily challengeable. His political adversaries did not disintegrate. Rather,
they strengthened themselves, and are now even more buoyed to challenge
Ramaphosa openly so, in public.
However, it is not so much Ramaphosa’s liberal driven rise
to the ANC’s leadership summit that has rendered him politically vulnerable at
the moment. In any event, he was elected by ANC branch members in good
standing. It is what he did not do after his election that has rendered him
eventually vulnerable in his first term of presidency.
He did not consolidate his political power within the ANC.
Just like any other president of the ANC, Ramaphosa was politically strongest
within the few months of his elections. He could have consolidated his
political power base within the party, in particular, at Luthuli House, across
the provinces’ leadership, and within the National Executive Committee (NEC).
Without grabbing the power at the party level, he has
allowed oppositional tendencies against his rule to emerge from the center.
Without tightening his power at the organizational level, he can’t tighten his
power at a state presidency level. Consequently, he is easily challengeable. In
the process, it will be difficult for him to perpetually defend Pravin.
What works for Ramaphosa for now, no one in the leadership
has the appetite to rise up and challenge the president. There is no appetite to
get rid of him. But there is all absolute intention to rule through him. There is a
growing intention to take and effect decisions through him. In any event, he is
a prime government executive deployee of the ANC.
But then, there is nothing untoward in this stance. Those
that funded his campaign, are actually driving a similar agenda. Politics is about
power and influence contestation for access and distribution of resources. Thus,
different groupings within and outside the ANC will constantly seek to influence
decision making. In this regard, Ramaphosa as the president, will remain a focal
point of power contestation. This will partly entail contestation over who
becomes minister or not, for any cabinet position.
So, what is the way forward?
Ramaphosa’s options are rather limited. One option is to
reshuffle cabinet. But he can not reshuffle without moving Pravin out of SoEs. Possibly
shift him without necessarily shifting him out of the cabinet entirely. This
should satisfy both the lobbyists within the ANC, and Gordhan’s and Ramaphosa’s
liberal backers outside the ANC. But this will only present a temporary reprieve. Now that the political snowball has been tipped at the top, it will continue rolling. So, he needs to develop a Machiavellian skin.
Ramaphosa’s strategy of relying on systems and processes
both at the party and state level is not politically sustainable for him.
Rather, he should build his own network both within the party, and at the state
level. He needs to apply a political power K53 – that is, work on his political
blind spots.
The president needs his feet more on the ANC grounds than with
his corporate allies, and the rest shall follow!
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Twitter @KunjaloD. www.kunjalod.co.za dumisani15@icloud.com
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